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A CRITICISM OF JUDICIALLY ADOPTED
COMPARATIVE PARTIAL INDEMNITY AS A
MEANS OF CIRCUMVENTING PRO RATA
CONTRIBUTION STATUTES
MICHAEL A. HUMMERT
T HE ADVENT of comparative negligence' in most Ameri-
can jurisdictions has created new problems with tradi-
tional methods of allocating tort loss among multiple defen-
dants, namely contribution and indemnity.' Many state
Under a comparative negligence system, the contributory negligence of the
person seeking recovery for injury to his person or property does not bar his recovery
in an action for negligence; however, the damages awarded to such person are dimin-
ished in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributed to him. Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
Contributory negligence is defined as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls
below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a
legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bring-
ing about the plaintiff's harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
Under the traditional contributory negligence rule, "[e]xcept where the defendant
has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery against
a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff
for the harm sustained by him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965).
' Traditionally, the distinction between contribution and indemnity was stated as
follows: "Indemnity seeks to transfer the entire loss imposed upon one tortfeasor to
another who in justice and equity should bear it. Contribution distributes the loss
equally among all tortfeasors, each bearing his pro rata share." Herrero v. Atkinson,
227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964) (emphasis added).
The advent of comparative negligence created new problems with traditional meth-
ods of allocating tort loss because the relevant percentages of fault of the multiple
tortfeasors played no part in the allocation of the loss under those traditional meth-
ods. If the court ruled that indemnity applied, the loss was completely shifted from
one tortfeasor to another. On the other hand, if the court ruled that contribution
applied, each tortfeasor's share was determined by dividing the judgment by the
number of responsible tortfeasors subject to the judgment. The traditional methods
of allocating tort loss were mechanical and often had little relation to the negligence
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
legislatures have responded to this problem by enacting con-
tribution statutes providing for pro rata contribution among
multiple defendants in negligence cases." During the last dec-
ade, and particularly in the last four years, several state su-
preme courts have judicially adopted the doctrine of compara-
tive partial indemnity because of the perceived inequities of
applying pro rata contribution under a system of comparative
negligence. A statutory system of pro rata contribution con-
flicts with the underlying purpose of a comparative negligence
system in that a defendant's share of the loss is determined
solely by the number of joint tortfeasors subject to the judg-
ment and not by his percentage of fault as assessed by the
jury.' The courts of those states which have enacted pro rata
of the parties. See notes 6-60 infra. See generally Heft, Spreading the Burden: The
Better Way to Accomplish Contribution is by Comparative Negligence, 22 FED'N INS.
COUNSEL Q. 37 (1972); Comment, Reconciling Comparative Negligence, Contribution
and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1159 (1977).
3 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1970) (quoted at note 172 infra); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-77 (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note 97 infra;) MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law Co-op 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to -6 (1969);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §9 23-3101 to -3106
(1976). All of these statutes, excluding the California statute, are patterned after the
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT (1955 version) drafted by the
American Law Institute. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 63 (1975).
Some jurisdictions have, however, adopted contribution statutes apportioning the
loss based on the relative degree of fault of each defendant. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1002(4) (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.31(3)(a) (West Supp. 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-12 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COmP.
LAWS ANN. § 15-8-15 (1967); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon
1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40(2) (Supp. 1975). Most of these statutes are pat-
terned after the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1939 version)
which requires contribution in accordance with the relative degrees of fault of the
tortfeasors. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 230 (1957).
4 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d
466 (Mo. 1978); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). See notes 84-170
infra and accompanying text. The doctrine of comparative partial indemnity essen-
tially provides for the apportionment of a loss among multiple tortfeasors based on
their relative degrees of fault as assessed by the trier of fact. American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182,
195 (1978).
' The purpose of a comparative negligence system is to develop "a system under
which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct
proportion to their respective fault." Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532
P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975). This purpose is obviously not
achieved under a pro rata contribution system where a defendant's share of the loss is
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contribution statutes, however, have no choice but to apply
and interpret those statutes; they cannot simply ignore the
statutes because they perceive that there is a better way to
allocate tort loss among multiple defendants.
This comment will first examine the historical development
of the parallel doctrines of contribution and indemnity, as
well as basic principles of statutory construction. Second, it
will examine the recent decisions adopting comparative par-
tial indemnity. Finally, it will criticize those decisions as a
means of judicially circumventing the contribution statutes in
the respective states in which they were rendered.
DEVELOPMENT OF INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
At common law there existed no right to allocation or ap-
portionment of damages among concurrent tortfeasors6 The
joinder of defendants7 was strictly limited to cases in which
determined solely by the number of responsible tortfeasors subject to the judgment.
The comparative contribution system is the form of contribution most compatible
with the system of comparative negligence, and it is not the purpose of this comment
to criticize the theory behind the doctrine of comparative partial indemnity which
attempts to allocate loss among multiple tortfeasors based on their relative degrees of
fault.
' Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Con-
current, or joint, tortfeasors are two or more persons who are liable to the same per-
son for the same harm. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it is not necessary
that "joint tortfeasors" act in concert or in pursuance of a common design, nor is it
necessary that they be joined as defendants. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
886A, Comment b (1979).
The common law rule prohibiting any allocation of tort loss among joint tortfeasors
is generally attributed to the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan. See generally
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER]; Le-
flar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932)
[hereinafter referred to as Leflar]. Some commentators have argued that the rule of
Merryweather v. Nixan is actually the exception to the rule, and that the true com-
mon law rule was determined in Battersey's Case, Winch's Rep. 48 (C.P. 1623) that
"among persons jointly liable the law implies an assumpsit either for indemnity or
contribution and the exception is that no assumpsit, either express or implied, will be
enforced among wilful tortfeasors or wrongdoers." Note, Contribution Between Per-
sons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176,
177 (1898). The case of Merryweather v. Nixan did in fact involve the deliberate and
intentional acts of joint tortfeasors. 8 Term Rep. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an injured person may join in one
action any number of tortfeasors where each of them is responsible for the entire
amount of damages for which the action is brought. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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each tortfeasor was said to be acting in concert with a com-
mon purpose to produce a single injury.8 The rule prohibiting
contribution among such tortfeasors was based on the ground
that since all of them were wrongdoers it would be inequitable
to permit the parties who had intentionally caused an injury
to use the courts to settle their differencesY Thus, each
tortfeasor was liable for the entire sum of the judgment, and
the release of one joint tortfeasor from liability effected the
release of all other joint tortfeasors as well.' 0
Over the years the term "joint tortfeasor" was expanded to
include not only intentional wrongdoers, but also persons
whose negligent conduct combined to cause damage." Later
courts seized upon the limitation that contribution was denied
to intentional tortfeasors, however, and applied the rule only
when the defendant/tortfeasor seeking contribution was a wil-
ful and conscious wrongdoer.' 2 The accepted English view
came to be that contribution was not denied in cases of mere
vicarious liability, negligence, accident, mistake, or other un-
intentional breaches of the law.'"
The great majority of American courts, however, refused to
permit contribution even when the acts of negligent
tortfeasors, although acting concurrently and independently,
resulted in a single injury to the plaintiff. 4 The courts allowed
§ 882 (1979). The joinder of parties is today largely governed by statutes or rules of
court as a procedural matter. The earliest common law rule, however, refused to per-
mit joinder of any defendants except those who had acted in concert to produce an
injury because in theory there was a mutual agency and the act of one defendant
became the act of all. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 882, Comment a (1979).
"- See Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); PROSSER,
supra note 6, at 305. See note 7 supra.
9 See Everet v. Williams, 9 L.Q. Rev. 197 (Ex. 1725) (commonly known as the
Highwayman's Case); PROSSER, supra note 6, at 305.
'o PROSSER, supra note 6, at 301.
" V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 252 (1974).
" See Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827); PROSSER, supra
note 6, at 306.
'3 See, e.g., Hillen v. I.C.I., 1 K.B. 455 (1934); Burrows v. Rhodes, 1 Q.B. 816
(1890). See PROSSER, supra note 6, at 306. See generally SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 86
(8th ed. 1934).
" See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217
(1905); Rieinger v. Ashton Co., 9 Ariz. App. 406, 453 P.2d 235 (1969); National Trailer
Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967).
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the plaintiff to choose the party against whom he desired to
recover and did not allow that defendant to receive any reim-
bursement from the other wrongdoer, reasoning that it was
not the duty of the courts to come to the aid of a wrongdoer.1 5
This rule caused many jurisdictions in the United States, ei-
ther statutorily 6 or judicially,17 to relax the rule against con-
tribution and permit recovery by one tortfeasor from another
for a portion of the common liability so long as the party
seeking partial recoupment had not been guilty of conduct
characterized as an intentional wrong.18
Statutes which allow a right of contribution can be classi-
fied into two groups. The majority of states which have al-
lowed contribution have adopted the rule that equity is equal-
ity and thus determine each party's pro rata share by dividing
the total judgment by the number of responsible tortfeasors
subject to the judgment.1 9 A minority of states, though, have
adopted the rule of comparative contribution which distrib-
utes each tortfeasor's proportionate share of the judgment
debt according to his relative degree of fault.2 0
Of the states that have adopted contribution by statute,
however, most place procedural limitations on its use. First,
the right to contribution does not arise unless a joint judg-
ment has been rendered against all tortfeasors from whom
contribution is sought.2 1 Second, the tortfeasor seeking contri-
15 See, e.g., Avery v. Central Bank, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106 (1909); Thweatt's
Adm'r v. Jones, 1 Rand. 328 (Va. 1823). See Leflar, supra note 6, at 131-32.
"0 See note 3 supra.
'7 See, e.g., Knell v. Feltman, 85 App. D.C. 22, 174 F.2d 662 (1949); Huggins v.
Graves, 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Const.
Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24
(1963); Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968).
"8 See, e.g., Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F.2d 590 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 635
(1931); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Jacobs v. General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462 (1961). See also
Allen, Joint-Tortfeasors-A Case for Unlimited Contribution, 43 Miss. L.J. 50, 55
(1972).
" See note 2 supra.
:0 See notes 3-4 supra.
21 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875 (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note 97 in-
Ira). Where such a requirement is imposed, the practical result is to prevent an ab-
sent tortfeasor from being forced to contribute since there can be no joint judgment
against him and the tortfeasor seeking contribution. This result is avoided only if the
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bution must have already discharged the entire judgment
debt, or at least more than his proportionate share, before he
can assert his right to contribution.22
Unlike the doctrine of contribution, indemnity was recog-
nized even at early common law. Courts recognized the right
of one defendant who was legally responsible to the plaintiff
for the plaintiff's damages, but who was not guilty of any fault
or wrongful conduct,2" to recover his entire loss from the indi-
vidual whose fault or wrongful conduct gave rise to the inju-
ries sustained by the plaintiff.24 This right of implied indem-
nity has been recognized by the various jurisdictions in the
United States which have adopted the common law.
Over the years, the courts defined, developed and modified
the rules governing the right of implied indemnity, and in so
doing a number of different tests were established. These tests
were to be applied to different fact situations for the purpose
of determining whether the right of implied indemnity existed
in a particular case.2 Examples of the various tests estab-
lished by the courts include the active-passive test,2 7 the pri-
absent tortfeasor can be joined under third party practice. See Dole v. Dow Chem.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972).
22 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875 (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note 97
infra).
23 The most common example of liability without fault is an employer's vicarious
liability for the negligent conduct of his employees under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-49 (1958).
2" See Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at 310-11.
25 See, e.g., Canadian Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 213 F.2d
658 (9th Cir. 1954); Thomas v. Malco Refineries, 214 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1954); Way-
lander v. Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry. Co., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953); Skala v.
Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931). Lunderburg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63
N.W.2d 355 (1954); McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936). See gen-
erally Comment, Another Look at Strict Liability: The Effect on Contribution
Among Tortfeasors, 79 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
886B, Comment a (1979).
20 For a good discussion of the various tests employed by most courts, see
Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the Total Loss Shifting Rem-
edy in a Partial Loss Shifting Jurisdiction, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 501, 516-27 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Walkowiak].
27 See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
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mary-secondary test,28 and the duty versus no-duty test.2 9 The
definitions of these tests have been vague and the application
of individual tests has been illogical and inconsistent.30
Under the active-passive test, a joint tortfeasor may be enti-
tled to indemnity when his negligence is "passive" as com-
pared to the joint tortfeasor-indemnitor, who is guilty of "ac-
tive" negligence.8 In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,3 ' a
United Air Lines DC-7 was involved in a mid-air collision
with an F-100F United States Air Force jet fighter near Las
Vegas, Nevada." United's Flight 736 was a regularly
scheduled flight from Los Angeles, California to Denver, Colo-
rado, and was flying in a major transcontinental airway known
as Victor 8. The jet fighter was on a training mission from
Nellis Air Force Base and was carrying an instructor pilot and
a student pilot practicing instrument flying. 4 The jet went off
course and crashed with the DC-7 in the Victor 8 airway, leav-
ing no survivors.35
Multiple actions were brought against United Air Lines and
the United States government, all of which were tried on a
consolidated basis. 6 Judgments were entered in favor of the
plaintiffs, and United and the government were granted con-
tribution against each other.3 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed in
part and granted indemnity in favor of United against the
government in the cases involving non-government employ-
ees.3 8 The court said that the government's negligent acts oc-
28 See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Maybarduk v. Bustamente, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
2' See, e.g., South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref d n.r.e.). The duty versus no-duty test is frequently an
element of the active-passive test, see note 27 supra, for implied indemnification. See
Walkowiak, supra note 26, at 526.
20 See Walkowiak, supra note 26, at 516.
31 Id.
22 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
3" Id. at 384.
4 d. at 385-86.
I d. at 387.
0 Id. at 384.
I /d.
28 Id. at 402.
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curred literally from the start to the finish of the events lead-
ing up .to the accident, 9 and that there was such a difference
in the contrasted character of fault as to warrant indemnity in
favor of United.40
The primary-secondary test is a variation on the active-pas-
sive test, and is based partly on a duty owed by one of the
defendants to the other. In Maybarduk v. Bustamente,4' the
plaintiff brought suit against a surgeon and hospital for inju-
ries sustained as a result of a hemostat being left in her abdo-
men following surgery."2 The surgeon filed a cross-complaint
for indemnity against the hospital alleging that the hospital
had failed to furnish him with a qualified and trained assis-
tant.48 The Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the cross-complaint and held that if the surgeon
could show that the hospital's omission to furnish a qualified
assistant was the primary cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then
the surgeon was entitled to indemnity.44
The duty versus no duty test is a composite of the active-
passive and primary-secondary tests. Simply stated, the right
to indemnity turns upon the issue of whether one defendant
breached a duty of care owed by that tortfeasor to another, in
addition to or coexistent with the primary duty owed the in-
jured party.48 When both parties violate a duty of care owed
the injured party, then each is guilty of the same quality of
'9 The court said that the cumulative effect of the government's acts was to dis-
patch the jet fighter on a training mission into the same area as a commercial plane,
with no warning to either aircraft. Moreover, the government's pilots likely had the
last clear chance to avoid the accident by taking evasive action. Thus, under all the
circumstances, the court concluded that the government and United were not in pari
delicto, and that United was entitled to indemnity. 335 F.2d at 402.
40 Id.
41 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
" Id. at 375.
13 Id. at 378.
4 Id. The court said that "where . . . both parties are at fault and both liable to
the person injured. . ., yet they are not in pari delicto as to each other, as where the
injury [to the plaintiff] has resulted from a violation of the duty which one [defen-
dant] owes the other, so that as between themselves, the act or omission of the one
from whom indemnity is sought is the primary cause of the injury . . ." then the
person seeking indemnity is entitled to recover. Id. at 376 (quoting Seaboard Airline
Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932)).
,5 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
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negligence toward the injured person and neither is entitled to
indemnity.'6
Indemnity, whether contractual or implied, is the right of a
tortfeasor who has been forced to pay a common liability to
force another tortfeasor to compensate him for the entire
amount that he has been forced to pay.'7 Unlike contribution
which involves a sharing of a loss among tortfeasors, indem-
nity shifts the total loss from one tortfeasor to another.'8 The
right to indemnification may arise from an express contract"
or from a contract implied in fact,60 or it may be quasi-con-
tractual,8 ' but "the right of a person seeking indemnity is the
,8 South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 947 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In South Austin, the parents of a six year old
boy brought an action against the manufacturer, owner and operator of a power
mower for injuries sustained by the boy when the mower operator backed over him.
Id. at 944. The court said that all three defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff, and
thus none was entitled to indemnity. Id. at 947.
41 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937).
" See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at 310. See also DOOLEY, MODERN TORT
LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 26.01 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DOOLEY].
19 A party may expressly agree to indemnify another for future damages. Such an
arrangement is generally covered by the law of contracts. The right to indemnity,
however, must be explicitly provided for in the contract if it is to be allowed. Ques-
tions of fault or active and passive negligence play no part in the analysis of the right
to indemnity under an express contract theory. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navi-
gazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.
Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
00 In the absence of an express contract to indemnify, see note 49 supra, a contract
is sometimes implied from an existing contractual relationship. The right of implied
contractual indemnity arises when one party to a contract breaches a duty thereun-
der, and the non-breaching party is held liable to a third person. The duty to indem-
nify is implied from the general contractual duty to exercise due care under the origi-
nal contract. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956); General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
01 Where there is no contractual basis for allowing indemnity, it is sometimes per-
mitted on equitable principles based on tort. The right of non-contractual implied
indemnity arises where the fault of one party substantially overshadows that of an-
other. In such a case the former will be required to indemnify the one who incurred
the liability for damages because to require him to pay the damages would be inequi-
table. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
379 U.S. 951 (1964); Miller v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 236 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1956).
Various tests have been employed to compare the relative fault of multiple
tortfeasors where the right of non-contractual implied indemnity is involved. See
notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text. Where the parties are in pari delicto, or
both equally or "actively" negligent, no right to indemnity exists. Where one party's
negligence, however, is termed active (or primary) and another's is termed passive (or
secondary), the former will be required to indemnify the latter if he is forced to pay
1981]
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right to receive full compensation for all damages he has suf-
fered as a result of the actions which form the basis for his
claim to indemnity. '52
The doctrines of contribution and indemnity are often con-
fused by attorneys and by the courts,53 but it is important to
note some key distinctions between them. Contribution ap-
portions the loss among multiple tortfeasors by requiring each
to pay his pro rata or proportionate share.5 Indemnity, on the
other hand, shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has
been forced to pay it to another tortfeasor who, for one reason
or another, should bear the burden instead.55 Consequently,
the right of indemnity and contribution among the same par-
ties are mutually exclusive; if a person is entitled to indem-
nity, the right of contribution does not exist.56 Contribution
normally exists by statute,7 whereas indemnity is a judicially
created common law doctrine." Furthermore, the right to pro
rata contribution pre-supposes that joint tortfeasors are
equally at fault, while non-contractual implied indemnity
shifts the liability to the party found to have the greater fault
in terms of being actively, or primarily, negligent.59
This "fault assessment" is probably the most dramatic dif-
ference between the concepts of pro rata contribution and in-
demnity.60 Courts ignore the relative fault of the judgment
the loss. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
, Walkowiak, supra note 26, at 511.
's PROSSER, supra note 6, at 310.
" See notes 14-22 supra and accompanying text.
" PROSSER, supra note 6, at 310. See notes 23-52 supra and accompanying text.
See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964).
See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(f) (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note 97 infra).
'7 See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 24-52 supra and accompanying text.
, Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1964). Par-
ties in pari delicto are not able to recover under a theory of non-contractual implied
indemnity. See note 51 supra.
60 See note 1 supra and accompanying text. Restatement (Second) of Torts sug-
gests that one of the problems with contribution is that it is statutory in most states,
and the statutes are usually ineptly drawn and contain serious and inequitable re-
strictions on the remedy. "Some influential state courts, frustrated by this [inequity)
and being unable to modify the statute, have declared that indemnity is an equitable
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debtors as among themselves in determining whether there is
a right to pro rata contribution and simply allocate the bur-
den of loss in equal shares to each tortfeasor. On the other
hand, in determining whether a right to non-contractual im-
plied indemnity exists, courts must scrutinize the relative
fault of the parties in assessing whether one is actively, or pri-
marily, negligent when compared to the other tortfeasor who
is simply passively, or secondarily, negligent.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Statutes which impose duties or establish rights which were
not recognized by the common law frequently have been
strictly interpreted."1 When any doubt exists as to the mean-
ing of legislation, courts employing a rule of strict construc-
tion have adopted the interpretation which makes the least,
rather than the most, change in the common law.' Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "[n]o statute
is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its
words import. It is not to be construed as making any innova-
tion upon the common law which it does not fairly express." 8
Strict construction as a rule of statutory interpretation has
been adopted in many jurisdictions." It has been employed
when reasonable doubt exists whether a change claimed to
have been made by a statute in the common law should apply
doctrine judicially adopted and subject to further judicial development for the pur-
pose of attaining justice. They have produced a judicial doctrine of 'partial indem-
nity,' with the proportion of responsibility of the parties depending upon the relative
percentages of fault. The potential merger of contribution and indemnity may there-
fore take place . . . with indemnity absorbing contribution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 886B, Comment m (1979).
' See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 113 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich.
1953); Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill. 2d 112, 126 N.E.2d 688 (1955); Martin v.
Martin, 58 Misc. 2d 459, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (Fam. Ct. 1968).
62 See generally SANDS, 3 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 61.01-.05
(4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as SANDS]; CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION, §§ 248-250 (1940).
:' Shaw v. Northern Pa. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
4 See, e.g., Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 159 So. 2d 618 (1964); Ramey v. Gunn,
221 Ark. 10, 253 S.W.2d 559 (1953); Universal Discount Corp. v. Brooks, 115 Ind.
App. 591, 58 N.E.2d 369 (1944); Doughty v. Maine Cent. Transp. Co., 141 Me. 124, 39
A.2d 758 (1944); Nielson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 141 Neb. 584, 4 N.W.2d 569
(1942).
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to a particular situation." Therefore, if a change is to be made
in the common law, the courts have required that the legisla-
tive intent to make such a change be clearly and plainly
expressed."
The rule of strict construction has been the object of a great
deal of criticism, primarily on the ground that it has no genu-
ine probative value for the purpose of establishing what the
legislature intended.6 7 The rule, however, has been generally
justified on the basis that it "serves to perpetuate traditional
principles of justice upon which the common law is
founded."' The rule that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are strictly construed has been thought to serve the
same policy of continuity and stability as the doctrine of stare
decisis has effectuated in the case law.e"
In a minority of jurisdictions, the legislatures have enacted
general interpretive legislation abrogating the rule of strict
construction of statutes in derogation of the common law. 0
Typically, such legislation provides that the statutes of the
states should be "liberally construed with a view to promote
its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice."7' Such
provisions have generally been effective in bringing about less
" See, e.g., Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Langmeyer, 342 11. App. 406, 96 N.E.2d
820 (1951); People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949).
Mason v. Hillside Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 833, 154 P.2d 490 (1944); Hummer v.
School City of Hartford City, 123 Ind. App. 624, 112 N.E.2d 891 (1953); Pineo v.
White, 320 Mass. 487, 70 N.E.2d 294 (1946); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30
A.2d 421 (1943); Woolcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916); Fenton v.
Young Chevolet Co., 191 Okla. 161, 127 P.2d 813 (1942).
'7 See Bruncken, The Common Law and Statutes, 29 YALE L.J. 516 (1920).
" SANDS, supra note 62, at § 61.01 and cases cited therein.
6' Stated simply, the doctrine of stare decisis provides that when the court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a given set of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it in future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
MOORE, MODERN CONSTITUTnoNs 54 (1957). The traditional rationale for the doctrine
has been that it promotes stability in the legal system. The doctrine rests upon the
principle that the law by which men are governed should be fixed, definite and
known, and should not lightly be modified or overruled. MOORE, STARE DEctsis 5
(1958).
7' See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-131 (1947);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 4 (West 1954); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (1977); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 2 (1960). See also Fordham and Leach, Interpretations of Statutes in Dero-
gation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. Rzv. 438, 449 (1950).
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.2 (West 1967).
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restrictive court decisions concerning the effect to be given
new legislation. 2 The requirement that statutes be construed
liberally does not establish a presumption that the common
law principles upon the subject have been altered or modified,
but merely requires that in any case where that question is to
be decided it must be determined without a presumption or
bias in favor of either interpretation."
Another principle of statutory construction is the rule that
words and phrases having well-defined common law meanings
are to be interpreted as having the same meanings when used
in statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter.7 4
A legislative definition of a term prevails over the common
law meaning where it is clear and explicitly applicable.75 Even
though a statute may define the way in which a particular
word is used, however, the common law meaning may, in cases
of reasonable doubt, be useful to a proper understanding of
the statute."6
A constitutional principle of statutory construction and of
judicial review in general is the notion that courts cannot sit
as legislatures. The separation of powers doctrine recognizes
that in the absence of some overriding constitutional, statu-
tory, or charter proscription, the judiciary has no authority to
invalidate duly enacted legislation7 or to nullify statutory
language.7 8 Further, when a jurisprudential rule has been in-
corporated into statutory law it can no longer be changed by
72 See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321
(1947); Chiesa & Co. v. City of Des Moines, 158 Iowa 343, 138 N.W. 922 (1912);
O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964).
7' See People v. Kings County Dev. Co., 48 Cal. App. 72, 191 P. 1004 (1920). See
also In re Crutcher, 61 Cal. App. 481, 215 P. 101 (1923); People ex rel. Krause v.
Harrison, 191 Ill. 257, 61 N.E. 99 (1901).
" See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); Hite v. United States, 168
F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948); Aberdeen Bindery, Inc., v. Eastern States Printing & Pub-
lishing Co., 166 Misc. 904, 3 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1938).
72 See People v. Burns, 198 Cal. App. 2d 839, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1962); Knudson v.
Jackson, 191 Iowa 947, 183 N.W. 391 (1921).
'6 See Gellman v. United States, 235 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1956); Walter v. Northern
Ins. Co., 370 Ill. 283, 18 N.E.2d 906 (1938).
77 City of San Fransisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707
(1975).
7S REA Enterprises v. California Coastal Zone Comm., 52 Cal. App. 3d 596, 125
Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1975).
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court decision.79 The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that it does not have the power to overturn legislation of a
state under the guise of constitutional interpretation simply
because the Justices believe they can provide better rules.6 0
The commentators seem in general agreement with the
principle that courts cannot sit as legislatures. Dean Robert
Keeton has argued that when the legislature has spoken to a
particular issue the courts must apply the mandate of the
statute absent a ruling that the statute is unconstitutional. 1
Thus, when the issue at hand is not directly answered by the
statute the court must interpret the statute to fill in the
"gaps" left by the legislature. When doing this, the court
should give the proper deference to the statute's manifesta-
tions of principle and policy to the extent that they can be
ascertained."9 Along these lines, Justice Frankfurter wrote
that a "judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge
nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of
policymaking might suggest, construction must eschew inter-
polation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of
creation."8
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE PARTIAL
INDEMNITY
In 1972, the New York Court of Appeals, in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.," propounded a variation to the doctrine of
non-contractual implied indemnity. Dow was charged with
negligently labeling a poisonous fumigant and with failing to
warn potential users of the danger of exposure to concen-
trated vapors following its use. Such negligence was alleged to
have resulted in the death of plaintiff's decedent.88 Dow filed
a third party complaint for indemnity against the decedent's
79 T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1975).
80 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
81 Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. Ati L. & COM. 1, 9
(1978).
62 Id.
s F. FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES 13 (1947).
" 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
36 Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
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employer alleging active and primary negligence in failing to
follow instructions on the label, for allowing untrained person-
nel to work with the fumigant, and for failing to ventilate and
test the enclosure after fumigation." The court reversed the
dismissal of the third party complaint and rejected the tradi-
tional "active-passive" test 7 in determining a defendant's
right to implied indemnity.88
In rejecting the traditional test, the court concluded that
while indemnity was traditionally an all-or-nothing rule,
"[t] here are circumstances which would justify apportionment
of responsibility between third-party plaintiff and third-party
defendant, in effect a partial indemnification."89 The court
reasoned that since the all-or-nothing rule of indemnity often
achieved as equally unfair a result as the strict common law
rule against contribution, indemnity itself should be tempered
to achieve a more equitable result." The Dole court proceeded
to modify the common law doctrine of indemnity' holding
that the "[right to apportionment of liability or to full in-
demnity, . . . as among parties involved together in causing
damage by negligence, should rest on relative responsibility
"92
The Dole court undertook this modification of the prior
common law indemnity doctrine even though New York had
enacted a contribution statute9 ' providing joint tortfeasors
:6 Id.
7 See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
88 30 N.Y.2d at 147, 153, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386, 392.
9 Id. at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 149-50, 282 N.E.2d at 292-93, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88.
1 See notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
92 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
3 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1964) (repealed 1974) (current version at
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976)) provided:
Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against defen-
dants in an action for a personal injury or for property damage, each
defendant who has paid more than his pro rata share shall be entitled
to contribution from the other defendants with respect to the excess
paid over and above his pro rata share; provided, however that no de-
fendant shall be compelled to pay any other such defendant an
amount greater than his pro rata share of the entire judgment.
Id. (emphasis added). The current New York contribution statute provides that "two
or more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury,
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with a right of pro rata contribution in limited circumstances.
Under the statute, New York law preserved the all-or-nothing
contributory negligence rule. The court emphasized the fact
that the contribution statute applied only to joint judgment
debtors' so that the effective application of the statute de-
pended in large part on the willingness or ability of the in-
jured party to sue more than one of those responsible for his
damages."8 Moreover, the court thought that there was a basic
unfairness in requiring a co-defendant to pay a greater share
of the judgment than the part for which he was judged
responsible. 6
California has been the leading jurisdiction in the develop-
ment of the judicially adopted doctrine of comparative partial
indemnity.'7 In Herrero v. Atkinson," a woman was negli-
injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them whether or
not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered against the person
from whom contribution is sought." N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
The Dole decision was codified in N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1976)
which provides:
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the
excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment
recovered by the injured party; but no person shall be required to con-
tribute an amount greater than his equitable share. The equitable
shares shall be determined in accordance with the relative culpability
of each person liable for contribution.
Id.
See note 93 supra.
30 N.Y.2d at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
Id. at 148, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The New York Court of
Appeals emphatically reaffirmed the Dole decision two and one-half months after its
rendition in Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972). The court there stated that the "rule as stated in Dole now
permits apportionment of damages among joint or concurrent tort-feasors regardless
of the degree or nature of the concurring fault. We believe the new rule of apportion-
ment to be pragmatically sound, as well as realistically fair." Id. at 29, 286 N.E.2d at
243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
Since 1957 the California contribution statute has provided as follows:
Section 875:
(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two
or more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribu-
tion among them . . ..
(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance
with the principles of equity.
(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one
tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid
more than his pro rata share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess
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gently injured in an automobile accident. She died a year and
one-half later as a result of a blood transfusion which was ad-
ministered negligently in the course of an operation necessi-
tated by the auto accident." There was no legal relationship
between the defendant driver and the medical defendants
other than the fact that both defendants contributed to the
death. 00 The California Court of Appeals held that both par-
ties were actively negligent in their separate acts. Neverthe-
less, the court allowed indemnity in favor of the negligent
driver and against the doctors and hospital for "that portion
of the damages caused by their own negligent conduct."''
The court concluded that "[t]here is no reason why the ulti-
mate burden of damages should not be distributed among the
various defendants, and each should be made to bear that
portion of the judgment which in equity and good conscience
should be borne by him.''1
Thus, under an indemnity theory,108 the Herrero court ap-
proved the apportionment of damages between tortfeasors
performing separate acts of negligence that combine to pro-
duce a single injury.1' Contrary to the traditional distinction
so paid over the pro rata share of the person so paying and in no event
shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his
own pro rata share of the entire judgment.
(f) This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing
law, and where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity
from another there shall be no right of contribution between them.
Section 876:
(a) The pro rata share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be
determined by dividing the entire judgment equally among all of them.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-76 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
" 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
Id. at 70, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
,00 Id. at 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
10 Id. at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
Id. at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
,03 The court affirmed the general rule that "an implied right of indemnity does
not exist among tortfeasors where the parties are in pari delicto, that is, when the
fault of each is of equal grade and similar in character." Id. See notes 47-52 supra
and accompanying text.
304 The court made special note of the fact that the driver's cross-complaint against
the doctors and the hospital sought indemnity and not contribution. The court went
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drawn in non-contractual implied indemnity cases between
"active" and "passive" tortfeasors, the court did not find one
party more "actively" negligent than the other but held that
each should be liable for damages caused by his own negli-
gence.' The court reasoned that the right of non-contractual
implied indemnity "depends upon the principle that everyone
is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong, and if
others have been compelled to pay damages which ought to
have been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from
him." 0 6
The Herrero and Dole decisions laid the foundation upon
which the doctrine of comparative partial indemnity would be
created. Neither the Herrero court nor the Dole court, how-
ever, gave any argument or rationale for ignoring the respec-
tive contribution statutes existing in each state.1 0 7 Both of
those courts attempted to focus on the distinction between
contribution and indemnity, but ended up using the terms al-
most interchangeably. Furthermore, since neither court pro-
vided any real guidelines for allowing partial indemnity except
general equitable considerations, most courts did not follow
their lead and continued to refrain from any attempt to ap-
portion loss under an indemnity theory.108
In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,'9
the Supreme Court of California adopted the doctrine of com-
parative partial indemnity. 10 The opinion was the court's first
major statement on the principles of comparative negligence
since its adoption of that system in Li v. Yellow Cab Co."' In
on to say that "[i]ndemnity seeks to transfer the entire loss imposed upon one
tortfeasor to another who in justice and equity should bear it. Contribution distrib-
utes the loss equally among all tortfeasors, each bearing his pro rata share." Id. at 73,
38 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (emphasis added). See note 97 supra.
101 227 Cal. App. 2d at 75, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
106 Id. See Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733
(1974) where another California court of civil appeal reached a similar result.
107 Compare note 92, supra, with note 97, supra.
108 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 32 Cal. App. 3d 918,
108 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d
694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1971).
109 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
11 20 Cal. 3d at 591-98, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-95.
' 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). In Li, the California
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American Motorcycle, a minor who suffered spinal injuries
while competing in an amateur cross-country motorcycle race
filed an action through a guardian ad litem against the Ameri-
can Motorcycle Association (AMA) and the Viking Motorcycle
Club (Viking), the organizations which had sponsored and col-
lected the entry fee for the race, and against numerous indi-
viduals. The complaint alleged that the defendants had negli-
gently designed, managed, supervised and administered the
race, and that as a result of such negligence the plaintiff had
suffered serious injuries.112
AMA filed an answer to the complaint denying the allega-
tions and subsequently sought leave of court to file a cross-
complaint against the plaintiff's parents, one of whom was
guardian ad litem."s The first count of the proposed cross-
complaint alleged that the parents had negligently failed to
supervise their son in consenting to his participation in the
race and that such negligence was "active," while AMA's neg-
ligence, if any, was merely "passive."'' Thus, the first cause
of action sought indemnity from the parents in the event that
AMA was found liable to the son." 5 In the second cause of
action of its proposed cross-complaint, AMA sought a declara-
tion that the negligence of all parties contributing to the in-
jury be considered in apportioning the liability."' This second
cause of action was based on an assumption that the decision
in Li established a new rule of proportionate liability under
which each concurrent tortfeasor who proximately caused an
indivisible harm would be held liable only for a portion of the
plaintiff's recovery determined on a comparative fault basis. 1 7
Supreme Court disposed of the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence and ju-
dicially adopted a system of "pure" comparative negligence in which the plaintiff's
damages are reduced by the proportion that his negligence bears to the total negli-
gence involved in his injury. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The
plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, does not bar his recovery, but merely
reduces the amount that he can recover. Id.
"1 20 Cal. 3d at 584-86, 578 P.2d at 902-03, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86.
:1 Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
114 Id.
8" See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
iNS 20 Cal. 3d at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
117 Id. AMA also argued that Li implicitly abrogated the rule of joint and several
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The trial court denied AMA's motion to file its cross-com-
plaint because the motion was unsupported by the existing le-
gal doctrines. AMA then sought a writ of mandate in the
court of appeal to effectuate its cross-complaint, but that
court affirmed the trial court's decision denying AMA's mo-
tion. Ultimately, the California Supreme Court granted a per-
emptory writ of mandate to review the case.116
The California Supreme Court's decision in American Mo-
torcycle extended the rule of partial indemnity employed in
Herrero and Dole'1 9 to all multiple tortfeasor cases involving
negligence. Furthermore, it gave defendants the right to join
all potential defendants in the lawsuit, but it retained the rule
of joint and several liability. In examining the common law
equitable indemnity doctrine, the court noted that while it
eliminated inequity and injustice in some extreme cases it still
suffered from the same "all-or-nothing" deficiency as the dis-
carded contributory negligence doctrine and "falls considera-
bly short of fulfilling Li's goal of 'a system under which liabil-
ity for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused
it in direct proportion to their respective fault.' "s The court
concluded that the California common law equitable indem-
nity doctrine should be modified to permit a concurrent
tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent
tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis to bring the doctrine
in line with Li's objectives.1' 1
The American Motorcycle court seemed to focus, at one
point, on the traditional distinction between contribution and
indemnity,1 22 but nevertheless concluded that the "dichotomy
liability of concurrent tortfeasors inasmuch as the percentage of fault of each party
was assessed by the jury, thus allowing "proportionate liability." Id. at 585-86, 578
P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
18 Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
119 See notes 84-108 supra and accompanying text.
20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
l Id.
"' Id. The court stated that "[i]n traditional terms, the apportionment of loss be-
tween multiple tortfeasors has been thought to present a question of contribution;
indemnity, by contrast, has traditionally been viewed as concerned solely with
whether a loss should be entirely shifted from one tortfeasor to another, rather than
whether the loss should be shared between the two." Id.
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between the two concepts is more formalistic than substan-
tive.' 123 The common goal of both doctrines, said the court, is
the equitable distribution of loss among multiple tort-
feasors.12 " The court further reasoned that the inequity of the
early common law rule against contribution led courts to cre-
ate the equitable indemnity exception.' 2  The exception
originated in the common sense proposition that when two in-
dividuals are responsible for a loss, but one of them is more
culpable than the other, it is only fair that the more culpable
party should bear a greater share of the 1088.12 6 Citing Her-
rero127 and Dole12 8 as precedentfor its conclusion, the court
held that California should judicially adopt a system of com-
parative partial indemnity which would permit a concurrent
tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent
tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.' 2
The primary argument raised against the court's adoption
of a common law comparative indemnity rule was that Cali-
fornia's existing contribution statute 30 precluded any such ju-
dicial development.' 3' The American Motorcycle court had
considerable difficulty in getting around this argument, and
its primary ground for rejecting that contention was that the
Dole court had "adopted a similar partial indemnity rule...
despite the existence of a closely comparable statutory
scheme.' 2 The court further reasoned that the Dole court
viewed the New York contribution statute as simply a partial
legislative modification of the harsh common law rule against
contribution. " The court concluded that the Dole court
1S3 Id. The court cited Judge Learned Hand's observation in Slattery v. Marra
Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951), that "indemnity is only an extreme form of
contribution."
20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
115 Id. at 592, 578 P.2d at 908, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
" 20 Cal. 3d at 591-93, 578 P.2d at 907-08, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. See generally
Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CAL. L. REv. 490 (1969).
"I7 See notes 97-108 supra and accompanying text.
... See notes 84-96 supra and accompanying text.
"' 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
180 See note 97 supra.
20 Cal. 3d at 599, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
Id. at 600, 578 P.2d at 913, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
133 Id.
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found nothing in the New York statutory scheme to indicate
that the legislature had intended to preclude judicial exten-
sion of the statutory apportionment concept through the
adoption of a common law partial indemnification doctrine.134
The American Motorcycle court similarly concluded that
nothing in the legislative history of the California contribu-
tion statute suggested that the legislature intended to pre-
empt the field or to foreclose future judicial developments
which further the act's principal purpose of ameliorating the
harshness and inequity of the old no contribution rule.15 The
court pointed to two specific sections of the California statute,
which were not present in the New York statute, to confirm
its conclusion. The court relied most heavily on the provision
preserving the right of indemnity and subordinating the right
of contribution to such right of indemnity.13 6 The court con-
cluded that since the equitable indemnity doctrine existed at
the time the statute was enacted, 87 the legislature must have
been aware of the doctrine. 8 The court further concluded
that the legislature desired, by enacting this provision, to ne-
gate any possible inference that the contribution statutes were
intended to eliminate such common law indemnity rights or to
preclude judicial development of the allocation of loss issue.13 9
"I" Id. at 601, 578 P.2d at 913, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 196. In fact, the Dole court never
expressly considered the legislative history of the New York contribution statute, or
the legislative intent in enacting the statute. See note 107 supra and accompanying
text.
20 Cal. 3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
SCAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875(f) (West Supp. 1980)-(quoted at note 97 supra).
137 It is important to note here that the equitable indemnity doctrine which existed
in 1957 shifted the total loss from one tortfeasor who was required to pay the judg-
ment to another tortfeasor who in equity should have to bear the burden instead
because his conduct was deemed more culpable. See notes 24-52 supra and accom-
panying text.
186 20 Cal.3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
"' Id. at 602-03, 578 P.2d at 914-15, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98. The court is appar-
ently correct in its conclusion that the enactment of § 875(f) was intended by the
legislature to negate any possible inference that the contribution statutes were in-
tended to eliminate the common law right of equitable indemnity, but only as it ex-
isted in 1957 when the statute was enacted. The court's admission in the text accom-
panying note 140, infra, and the enactment of § 875(c) (see note 97 supra) which
provides that "in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution
beyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment," negate the court's conclusion
that the act did not preclude judicial expansion of equitable indemnity. The legisla-
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The court admitted, however, that the 1957 legislature could
not have foreseen the advent of comparative negligence and
the adoption of comparative partial indemnity.14 0
The second provision relied on by the court to confirm its
conclusion that the contribution statute did not preclude judi-
cial adoption of comparative indemnity states that the "right
of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the
principles of equity."'" The court reasoned that the explicit
mandate of this provision "demonstrates that the Legislature
did not conceiye of its contribution legislation as a complete
and inflexible system for the allocation of loss between multi-
ple tortfeasors.' 4'1 The court further concluded that the legis-
lature obviously intended for the judiciary to elaborate on the
term "principles of equity," and thus the act itself refuted the
argument that the legislature intended to curtail judicial dis-
cretion in apportioning damages among multiple tort-
feasors.1"
While the court's interpretation of the provision appears
logical if the provision is read by itself, the court's conclusion
that it is not precluded from adopting comparative partial in-
demnity by the existence of the contribution statute does not
follow when the provision is read in the context of the entire
statute. " The premise behind the adoption of pro rata con-
tribution is that equity is equality and thus each joint
tortfeasor should bear that portion of the loss determined by
dividing the total loss by the number of responsible tort-
feasors subject to the judgment.145 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the California contribution statute did not
preclude it from developing a parallel, albeit more expansive,
common law doctrine of comparative partial indemnity. 46
tion recognizes the critical distinction between the separate concepts of indemnity
and contribution, but the court chooses to ignore it.
14 20 Cal. 3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
1 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 875(b) (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note 97 supra).
"42 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
143 Id.
144 See note 139 supra.
" DOOLEY, supra note 48, at § 26.20.
14' Some commentators hailed the California Supreme Court's decision in Ameri-
can Motorcycle as a definite step towards clearing up the problems of allocation of
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Only a few months later, the California Supreme Court, re-
affirming its opinion in American Motorcycle, took an addi-
tional step in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart. 14  In that
case, the plaintiff was injured in a Safeway supermarket when
the shopping cart she was using broke and fell on her foot,
causing serious injuries requiring surgery. 14  The plaintiff
brought suit against Safeway, the owner of the cart, Nest-
Kart, the manufacturer of the cart, and Technibilt Corpora-
tion, a company which had on occasion repaired some of the
carts, alleging that the defendants were liable for her injuries
under both strict liability and negligence principles. At trial,
which took place before the decision in American Motorcycle,
the jury absolved both the plaintiff and Technibilt of any re-
sponsibility for the accident. The trial court, however,
awarded the plaintiff damages of $25,000 against both
Safeway and Nest-Kart. 14
The jury's verdict indicated that Safeway's liability rested
on both negligence and strict liability grounds and that Nest-
Kart's liability was based solely on strict liability principles.150
The issue raised before the California Supreme Court was
whether the comparative indemnity doctrine of American Mo-
torcycle should be used as the basis for apportioning liability
loss among multiple tortfeasors which had been created by the judicial adoption of
comparative negligence in Li, see note 2 supra. However, these commentators simply
accept the court's decision that the California contribution statute does not preclude
them from adopting comparative indemnity, without questioning the court's reason-
ing for so concluding. See Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Collide With Com-
parative Negligence-The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 779 (1978); see also McKay, American Motorcycle Association vs. Superior
Court: From Comparative Negligence to Comparative Indemnity, 5 ORANGE Courv
BAR J. 180 (1978).
147 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
14s Id. at 325, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
149 Id. The jury found Safeway 80% responsible and found Nest-Kart 20% respon-
sible. As might be expected in such a situation, Safeway moved for a judgment of
contribution against Nest-Kart to require Nest-Kart to pay 50% of the judgment.
The trial court indicated that common sense called for an apportionment of the judg-
ment based on the relative fault of the parties, but ultimately concluded that such
comparative apportionment was not permissible in light of the existing statutory
contribution provisions and granted Safeway's motion for contribution. Id. at 326-27,
579 P.2d at 443, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
18" Id. at 326, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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between two tortfeasors, one of whose liability was derived
solely from principles of strict liability while the other's liabil-
ity was derived, at least in part, from negligence theory.151
The court concluded that even though the trial had taken
place before the decision in American Motorcycle, the com-
mon law doctrine of comparative partial indemnity adopted in
that caselas could be used to apportion the loss between
Safeway and Nest-Kart.15s The court reasoned that "[n]othing
in the rationale of strict product liability conflicts with a rule
which apportions liability between a strictly liable defendant
and other responsible tortfeasors. "154
In 1978, the same year that American Motorcycle was de-
cided, the supreme courts of Missouri, Illinois and Oklahoma
also adopted the doctrine of comparative partial indemnity. In
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co.,'"
the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the "active-passive" test
generally used in Missouri because it produced illogical re-
sults,156 and concluded that a "principled right to indemnity
should rest on relative responsibility."1' 7 The court acknowl-
edged the existence of the Missouri contribution statute,' "
Id. at 325, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
" See notes 109-146 supra and accompanying text.
153 21 Cal. 3d at 332, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
Id. at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554. In discussing the trial court's
conclusion that the California contribution statute prevented the apportionment of
loss among multiple defendants based on their relative degree of fault (see note 149
supra) the California Supreme Court said that "American Motorcycle has now ex-
plicitly held that. . . the existing contribution statutes do not in themselves necessa-
rily prohibit apportionment of liability among multiple tortfeasors on a comparative
fault basis." 21 Cal. 3d at 328, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
"s 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978). In Sampson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 560 S.W.2d
573 (Mo. 1978), the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a $300,000 judgment against
Missouri Pacific for damages for injuries received by plaintiff, an employee of its con-
signee, when he fell from the top of a three decker auto rack rail car. The instant case
arose from Missouri Pacific's attempt to bring Whitehead & Kales, the manufacturer
and installer of the auto rack, into the Sampson case as a third party defendant liable
to Missouri Pacific for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. 566 S.W.2d at 467.
,51 Id. at 470-72. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
157 566 S.W.2d at 472.
I" Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1969) provides that "[d]efendants in a judgment
founded on an action for the redress of a private wrong shall be subject to contribu-
tion . . . ." While the Missouri statute does not itself define contribution, the court
had always observed that contribution was founded on the principle that equity is
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but avoided the issue by stating simply that it applied only to
judgment defendants. 5 9 The Missouri Supreme Court also re-
lied on Missouri's third party joinder rule1 60 as a basis for
adopting comparative indemnity. The court concluded that
"the legislature, as a matter of policy, decided that a third
party could be brought into the case where liable to the origi-
nal defendant either in whole or in part for the plaintiff's
claim against him." 1 1
In Laubach v. Morgan,"2 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted a rule similar to comparative partial indemnity even
though Oklahoma still prohibits contribution altogether
among joint tortfeasors."' The court professed to do away
with the "entire liability rule" by providing that multiple
tortfeasors are severally liable only for the percentage of the
damages which can be attributed to them individually.'" The
court concluded that the rationale behind comparative partial
indemnity was most consistent with the underlying principle
of comparative negligence that assesses liability in direct pro-
portion to the respective fault of each person whose negli-
gence caused the damage.' 6 5
equality and that there could only be pro rats reimbursement under the statute. See
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Farmers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 224 (Mo.
Civ. App.-St. Louis 1970); Missouri Dist. Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 338
Mo. 692, 93 S.W.2d 19 (1935).
566 S.W.2d at 473.
160 Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.080 (1949).
.6 566 S.W.2d at 468.
162 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). In Laubach, plaintiff Laubach sued defendants
Morgan and Martin for damages resulting from a three car collision. Defendant Mar-
tin cross-petitioned against defendant Morgan. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiff for $4,000, which was reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence
(30%) to $2,800. Id. at 1072.
I" Oklahoma's contribution statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 831 (1971), deals only
with contracts and has never been applied to joint tortfeasors. See National Trailer
Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967).
', 588 P.2d at 1074. The Oklahoma court is the only court adopting comparative
partial indemnity that has chosen also to reject the archaic joint and several rule of
liability, which is itself arguably incompatible with the system of comparative negli-
gence. That subject, however, is outside the scope of this comment.
'66 Id. at 1075. The court said that "[i]f liability attaches to each tortfeasor in pro-
portion to his comparative fault, there will be no need for added litigation by defen-
dant seeking contribution. The adoption of the theory of comparative fault satisfies
the need to apportion liability without invading the Legislature's power to grant con-
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The Illinois Supreme Court, in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co.166 and two companion
cases,167 also adopted a system of comparative partial indem-
nity in 1978. At that time in Illinois, there existed no right of
contribution among tortfeasors.15 The court rejected the ar-
gument that the abolition of the no-contribution rule was best
left to action by the legislature, and stated that where the
court had created a rule or doctrine that was now unjust they
have the power to modify or abolish it."19 The court concluded
that "governing equitable principles require that ultimate lia-
bility for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the
relative degree to which [each tortfeasor's] conduct proxi-
mately caused them. '17 0
There is one recent opinion, however, which refuses to fol-
low the trend of judicially adopted comparative partial indem-
nity. The Supreme Court of Alaska in Arctic Structures, Inc.
v. Wedmore1 7 1 felt constrained by the existence of the Alaska
contribution statute17 2 from adopting such a doctrine. The
tribution." Id.
166 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
167 Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1978); Robinson v.
International Harvester Co., 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1978). See also Zaremski
and Burns, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: Genesis of Comparative Fault in Illinois?, 67
ILL. BAR J. 334 (1979).
168 Illinois did recognize the exception to the general rule prohibiting contribution
that a "passive" tortfeasor could obtain indemnity from an "active" tortfeasor. 70 Ill.
2d at 3, 374 N.E.2d at 439.
169 Id. at 6, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
170 Id.
1 605 P.2d 426 (1979).
172 ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010-.060 (1973) provides as follows:
Section 09.16.010:
(a) [Wihere two or more persons become jointly or severally liable
in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even
though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor
who has paid more than his pro rate share of the common liability,
and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess
of his pro rata share. No tort-feasor is compelled to make contribution
beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.
(f) This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under ex-
isting law. If one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the
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court noted that the "statutory right of contribution is ex-
pressly limited to the pro rata share of the common liability
and '[n]o tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond
his own pro rata share of the entire liability.' ,,173
Petitioners in Arctic Structures contended that despite the
express language of the Alaska contribution act requiring pro
rata distribution of liability for damages among concurrent
tortfeasors, the underlying purpose of the act was the fair and
equitable treatment of multiple defendants. 17 4 The peti-
tioner's argument, like that made by AMA in American Mo-
torcycle,'75 was based primarily on the Alaska Supreme
Court's adoption of comparative negligence in Kaatz v.
State,1 7 6 that each party should be liable for the portion of
the damages representing his percentage of fault. The Alaska
Supreme Court rejected this argument based on what they
perceived to be the explicit mandate of the Alaska contribu-
tion statute that pro rata contribution be applied in appor-
tioning loss among multiple tortfeasors.177
CONCLUSION
There is a definite trend towards judicial adoption of a sys-
tem of comparative partial indemnity, or some form of "com-
parative contribution." The courts are struggling over new
problems with traditional methods of allocating tort loss cre-
ated by the advent of comparative negligence in most Ameri-
right of the indemnitee obligee is for indemnity and not contribution
Section 09.16.020
(3) principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall
apply.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010-.020 (1973) (emphasis added).
Compare these provisions with those of the California contribution statute quoted
at note 97 supra. See note 139 supra.
I'l 605 P.2d at 430. See note 139 supra where it was pointed out that the American
Motorcycle court completely ignored almost identical provisions which existed in the
California contribution statute. See note 97 supra.
605 P.2d at 431.
0,8 See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
176 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
, 605 P.2d at 430-31.
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can jurisdictions. 78 The traditional methods of contribution
and indemnity are at odds with the relative apportionment of
fault which takes place under a system of comparative negli-
gence. The system of comparative partial indemnity, like com-
parative contribution, apportions the loss among responsible
tortfeasors according to their relative degrees of fault, and
such a system is most compatible with the adoption of com-
parative negligence. 179
In many states, however, the legislatures are trying to come
to grips with this problem and in most states in which contri-
bution statutes have been enacted the legislatures have opted
for pro rata, rather than comparative, contribution."' Where
a legislature has enacted a contribution statute, it represents
the legislature's answer to a particular legal issue, namely the
question of allocation of tort loss among multiple defendants.
When a statute directly addresses and answers such an issue
the courts have no choice but to apply the statute unless they
are willing to rule the statute unconstitutional.' 8 Only when
the statute does not answer a particular question can the
court interpret the statute to fill in the "gap" left by the legis-
lature,8 2 but even then the court must adhere to the policy
and intent manifested by the legislature through the
statutp.183
Most of the courts adopting comparative partial indemnity
have chosen to ignore completely the contribution statutes ex-
isting in their respective states. 84 The California Supreme
Court in American Motorcycle"s made the best attempt of
any of the courts at arguing that they were not precluded by
the California contribution statute from adopting such a doc-
trine.18 6 In fact, it was the only court to actually deal directly
176 See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
179 See note 4 supra.
0SO See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
: See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
182 See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
83 See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
184 See note 107 supra and accompanying text. See notes 158-59 supra and accom-
panying text.
: See notes 109-46 supra and accompanying text.
'" See notes 130-46 supra and accompanying text.
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with the issue of preclusion.
The court's reasoning in American Motorcycle, however,
does not hold up under close scrutiny when examined in light
of the entire California contribution statute.1 87 While the
court's selective reading of the statute appears at first glance
to support its argument, it completely ignores the section of
the statute which provides that "in no event shall any
tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his own
pro rata share of the entire judgment."188 A clearer mandate
by the legislature could hardly be imagined, but the court
chooses not to make reference to it.180
The American Motorcycle court instead relies on two other
provisions of the California contribution statute to support its
adoption of comparative partial indemnity.190 The court's ,reli-
ance on these provisions is misplaced, however, in light of the
apparent intent of the statute and traditional definitions of
contribution and indemnity. The court quotes that part of the
statute providing that the right of contribution "shall be ad-
ministered in accordance with the principles of equity," yet it
is established that the premise upon which pro rata contribu-
tion is based is that equality is equity.191
The other provision relied on by the court says that "[t]his
title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing
law"19" and goes on to subordinate the right of contribution to
such right of indemnity. 98 In 1957, when the California con-
tribution statute was enacted," ' the right of non-contractual
implied indemnity shifted the entire loss from one tortfeasor
to another who in equity should bear the burden instead.105
There was no right of partial indemnity which shifted only a
part of the loss between the joint tortfeasors.1"
"I See note 97 supra.
"8' CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875(c) (West Supp. 1980) (quoted at note' 97 supra).
119 See note 139 supra.
19o See notes 136-46 supra and accompanying text.
"9' See notes 141-46 supra and accompanying text.
'92 CAL. CiV. PROC. CoDE § 875(f) (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
193 See notes 136-40 supra and accompanying text.
"', See note 97 supra.
"'5 See note 137 supra.
"I See notes 137-39 supra.
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The use by the courts of the label "partial indemnity" to
identify this new judicial doctrine is itself a contradiction in
terms, and illustrates the problem with the adoption of this
doctrine. Saying that there is a right of "partial indemnity" is
essentially the same thing as saying that the courts will allow
a "partial total" shift of the tort loss from one defendant to
another. Obviously, such a statement makes little sense con-
sidering the ordinary use of the words. Indemnity is a total,
not partial, loss shifting remedy, and where one party is enti-
tled to indemnity he is entitled to be reimbursed for the en-
tire amount which he has been forced to pay.197 Contribution,
on the other hand, is a partial loss shifting remedy which allo-
cates the loss between joint tortfeasors either pro rata, or pro-
portionately according to their relative degrees of fault.198
Where the legislature has adopted pro rata contribution by
statute, the courts of that state have no choice but to apply
pro rata contribution even if there is, in their opinion, a better
method of loss allocation among multiple tortfeasors.199 The
courts which have adopted comparative partial indemnity in
spite of the existence of a pro rata contribution statute 00 have
done so because they cannot change the statute to provide for
comparative, rather than pro rata, contribution. The courts
cannot substitute their judgment for the legislature's, and the
fact that the courts cannot change the statute raises one of
the best arguments why they should not adopt comparative
partial indemnity to circumvent judicially the operation of the
contribution statutes.
Comparative partial indemnity is nothing more than the
adoption of a system of comparative contribution by the
courts in complete disregard of the existing contribution stat-
utes. The judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from acting
as a legislature by the separation of powers doctrine.210 The
courts cannot judicially adopt a doctrine which effectively
"17 See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 55-59, 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
119 See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
200 See notes 84-170 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
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nullifies a statute simply because they think that the judicial
doctrine is a better way to handle the particular problem ad-
dressed by the legislation. The court must either apply the
statute, or strike it down as unconstitutional. 02
The issue of contribution and indemnity is as important in
aviation law as it is in any other area of the law where negli-
gence principles are applicable. 03 The effect of the problem
discussed in this comment can easily be demonstrated by us-
ing the facts of United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener 0 " as a hypo-
thetical. Assuming for the moment that the crash occurred in
California before the California Supreme Court's decision in
American Motorcycle, rather than in Nevada,0 5 the applica-
tion of the California contribution statute 06 would have re-
sulted in both United Air Lines and the United States govern-
ment paying one-half of the damages awarded to the multiple
plaintiffs.0 7 An application of comparative partial indemnity,
on the other hand, would require each defendant to pay that
portion of the damages representing his relative degree of
fault.2 0 8 Under the facts of Wiener, where one defendant is
found to be greatly more negligent than the other, his propor-
tion of the damages will greatly exceed the one-half that he
would pay if the contribution statute were applied. In major
aircraft litigation where accidents tend to be catastrophic,
such a change could result in millions of dollars difference in
the amount of judgment each defendant will have to pay.
Any change in an existing pro rata contribution statute,
however, must be made by the legislature amending the stat-
ute to provide for comparative contribution. The courts can-
101 See notes 81-82 supra.
00, See generally Oldham and Maynard, Indemnity and Contribution Between
Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants in Major Aircraft Litigation, 43 J. AIR. L.
& CoM. 245 (1977).
"I See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
106 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
00 See note 97 supra.
107 This, of course, also assumes that the California court would not rule as the
Ninth Circuit did that the government was guilty of "active" negligence while
United's negligence was merely passive, 335 F.2d at 402, and thus United would not
be entitled to implied indemnity.
,o See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
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not ignore the statute and rely on the parallel doctrine of in-
demnity to circumvent completely the legislature's mandate
that contribution in that state be by a pro rata system. To
allow the courts to do so is in effect to allow the courts to
legislate away the statutes which they believe should be
changed, not because the statutes are unconstitutional, but
because they believe that there is a better way to handle the
particular problem. The courts cannot effectively circumvent
pro rata contribution statutes by expanding the doctrine of
non-contractual implied indemnity to create a separate judi-
cial system of comparative partial indemnity which is nothing
more than comparative contribution.

